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Transitional Justice Enabling Democratic Backsliding
In a new issue of Constitutional Political Economy, 17-21 CISSR Faculty Fellow and Associate Professor of Political Science, Monika Nalepa builds on existing theories of democratic backsliding by zooming into the constitutional crisis in Poland after 2015. She finds that an unfinished transitional justice project gave Law and Justice party (PiS) the excuse and pretext to start reelecting into office aspiring autocrats. Almost immediately upon coming to power PiS began to reshuffle the Constitutional Tribunal, the constitutional court in Poland, and to introduce reforms to “flatten” the structure of the judiciary system. This case study fits into a larger pattern of how younger democracies are more susceptible to efforts that weaken their constitutional courts, in part because the constitutions themselves are younger, but also, in part, because their societies are not yet well socialized to the ideas of rule of law, both of which put human rights, especially ethnic and religious minority rights, at stake.
Additionally, in a recent article on domestic terrorism, Prof. Nalepa and Colleen Murphy (University of Illinois) argue that to better prevent domestic terrorism, the United States must fundamentally change the vetting process for screening new hires. This is especially important when vetting those with the most power in society like the military and law enforcement.
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